The main purpose of this article is to analyze the attitude Šalkauskis and Maceina held towards the political philosophy. Later writings of Maceina notwithstanding, in this article we find the analysis of the perspectives that characterized these authors during the Interwar period. The article is based on the assumption that the failure to take account of Šalkauskis and Maceina’s attitude held toward the political philosophy makes the overall discussion on their political outlook non-valid. Neither of these authors can be dealt with as political philosophers in the strict sense of this word. They touched upon the issues this discipline embraced in the context of the works they had devoted to an entirely different purpose. Thus, before proceeding toward the examination of their political outlooks, it is necessary to identify their relationship with the problems this discipline is set to answer.

There is a certain degree of paradox in the way Šalkauskis and Maceina treat politics. While taking a wide interest in the problems of political life both of them avoid any analysis of political philosophy. These authors found it interesting to touch upon the political themes. However, if we look at their philosophical output, we can trace the determination to avoid wider discussion of the issues pertaining to this discipline. Šalkauskis inaugurated the Interwar period with two semi-theoretical, semi-publicist works. Both of them substantiate his talents of a political philosopher – *Krikščioniškoji politika ir gyvenamoji valanda* (*Christian Politics and the Living Hour*) and *Momento reikalai ir principų reikalavimai* (*The Matters of Moment and Demands of the Principles*). Nevertheless, following the 1926 Šalkauskis’ interest in the political philosophy went through an obvious recession. His famous 1935 letter to the President and his fourth-decade works on the *Ateitininkai* ideology belong to a completely different genre. Besides, the majority of his fourth-decade political works replicate the basic ideas of the previous period.

Maceina’s view of political philosophy is even more complicated. This author liked it very much to discuss political matters; however, he found it very
difficult to obtain the theoretical language fit enough to examine issues characteristic to political philosophy. What he uttered on a level of principle appeared to be different from what he used to say during the so-called “practical advice”. *Individus-asmuo ir valstybė (Individual-Person and the State)* is the best proof of this. On the level of principle one may find the ideas highly familiar to the liberal ones: “a person is an objective by himself, thus, he cannot serve anybody’s needs as a means”\(^1\). At the same time, having analyzed his “practical advises” deep enough, we may see things contrary to the latter. In his opinion, the state may pose a demand that individual’s “body life serve her [state’s] interests and her security”; “can regulate the size of the family”; “has rights to command and ration individual property, control its sources, constrict and even put an end to them. She may even apply a right to forfeit this property for the sake of the common good”.\(^2\)

The way Maceina dubbed the titles of the articles may create misleading impression: the titles refer to political matters, however, in reality they speak about the issues of the philosophy of culture, religion, and history. Since the very beginning of his career as a philosopher this author had committed himself to analyzing public issues. His negative attitude toward any contact more serious with the political philosophy, however, is the main paradox of his oeuvre. His major works, despite numerous political references, are dedicated to analyzing historiosophical, not political, issues. Even his famous *Socialinis teisingumas (Social Justice)*, a masterpiece that according to the modern canons can be attributed to the sphere of political philosophy, demonstrates an obvious will to get away from politics. In the introduction of this work the author writes: “This book is still an outline. In its constructive part (Chapter III) the book presents the very principles and talks about their implementation in the life of a Catholic, alone. Thus, in the meantime we must avoid speaking about concrete ways and concrete measures how to implement the principles referred to because we still disagree on the very principles”.\(^3\) What draws the attention is that the author of these lines wants to talk about the principles of social justice that are relevant to none but the Catholic community. It means he leaves the society at large aside. Furthemore, in this work we come across a few references about the state as a tool of implementing the principles of social justice.

Šalkauskis’ love for the philosophy of culture is what makes his interest in political philosophy secondary. In his essays on the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis shuns making any major allusion on politics. He prefers speaking about arts - “the brightest illustration of the essence of culture”\(^4\) to all the discussions on politics. Even the ethics - closest neighbour of the political philosophy – is no match to the aesthetics. In the *Enciklopedinė filosofijos dalis (Encyclopedic Part of the Introduction on Philosophy)* eight pages are devoted to aesthetics, whereas the ethics occupy only one and a half pages.\(^5\) Writing his
works on the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis evades a more thorough analysis of political issues. Whenever he touches upon a certain political topic he immediately skips from that subject to another. *Geopolitinė Lietuvos padėtis ir lietuvių kultūros problema (Geopolitical Situation of Lithuania and the Problem of the Culture of Lithuanians)* is the best proof of cultural philosophy pushing political philosophy away from its established positions.

What is most surprising, however, is the fact that in the essays devoted to the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis does not identify politics as a separate cultural phenomenon. Philosophy of law is the only discipline author designates as kindred to the philosophy of culture. One may get an impression that he deliberately evades wider debates on the issues of the philosophy of law and the political philosophy. In the *Kultūros filosofijos metmenys (Parameters of the Philosophy of Culture)* he becomes embroiled in the discussion of the issues that characterize the philosophy of economy. At the same time he voices not a single word on the political matters.

In addition to the already mentioned *Social Justice*, the following articles — *Individual-Person and the State* and *Tauta ir valstybė (The Nation and the State)* — could be referred to as the essays that illustrate Maceina's political philosophy best. Extensive debates on the ideas of the latter articles might be our first alternative choice; at the same time, however, we must acknowledge that this is Maceina's one of the most consistent political treatises, devoid of appeals for matters alien to politics — ethnology, eschatology, and dichotomy of spirits or Prometheus.

Alternatively, in the article *Individual-person and the State* one could observe an excellent demonstration of all the weak sides of Maceina as political philosopher. In this article author's inability to deal with the theoretical language appropriate to the analysis of political phenomena becomes extremely evident. Any substance familiar to the reader disappears under the philosophical terms and concepts the author employs. Principal thesis of the article is nothing but shocking: “the State cannot be moved into the soul-related category”. The impression one might generate as a result is that applying such theses logically follows his wish to push politics away from the sphere of culture.

*Individual-Person and the State*, an article, was written as a commentary to the well-known 1936 declaration *To the Institution of an Organic State*. In this article Maceina backed the general intention of the declaration and disapproved its individual statements. The declaration put it clear: “the future of the State is the future of the Nation”7, whereas Maceina aimed to establish the contrary position: “The State does not count as part of the spiritual community”8. What follows such a comment is a much more conservative impression of the declaration we get, different to what we may think once we have completed reading the text.

Comparison of Šalkauskis and Maceina comments indicates that the former
favors democracy whereas the latter is inclined to overestimate the role of the state. This conclusion is underpinned by the analysis of the concepts of corporatism. Šalkauskis is used to accentuating the decentralizing role of corporations: “What the spirit of democracy demands is the decentralization of the state duties in all spheres where more or less intensive participation of the interested people in dealing with their own affairs ensures the security of individual rights that the latter require and the former provide”\textsuperscript{9}. Maceina’s attitude on corporations, instead, refers to the interests of the state: “corporation is an instrument of the state”\textsuperscript{10}.

The attitude Maceina holds toward philosophy is not the right one in order to explore political issues, “An act of philosophic knowledge, - in his opinion, - is an essentially personal matter. The truth is personal (italics – A.M.) The truth may not be given from above. It must be lived over inside”\textsuperscript{11}. This attitude better applies to artists than to the political philosophers (“Aesthetic choice is always individual, whereas the aesthetic experience – a private one”). No doubt, the political philosophy entails more attention to be drawn to the idea of common good. Maceina’s philosophic temperament, meanwhile, brings him into an entirely opposite direction, that of romantic individualism. The way he viewed and treated philosophic schools reflects this very well: “Philosophy lays down the requirement to move away from one’s teachers because it insists on exposing person’s unique, original nature”\textsuperscript{12}. Such an attitude is hardly compatible with the political philosophy which is barely imaginable without different kinds of “-isms”.

Maceina is well known for his inclination to aestheticize political phenomena\textsuperscript{13}. In his works contemplative aesthetic answers prevail over the political analysis. His poetical imagination regularly destroys the conventions of political life. In this regard his attitude towards the Bolshevism is of special interest: “In the Bolshevist world the new type of culture has been developing, completely different both Marxist or Liberal culture. Marks of Prometheus make it different from the tradesmen and the bankers’ culture. Hereby, this type of culture approximates a theistic type of culture, and via its ideal – like character almost merges\textsuperscript{14}. The author held a miserable understanding of the political build-up of the Soviet Union.

Ever since the middle of the 1930s, Maceina had begun to show more and more resemblance with the XIXth century poets romanticists. It is not without due cause that his Prometėjimo dvasia (Spirit of Prometheus) begins with the Aeschylus Tragedy and Adam Mickiewicz’ All Soul’s Day interpretations. The ending of this masterpiece is also literary: “The tide is coming in; it catches us and takes us together with into the mysterious eternity”\textsuperscript{15}. Another Interwar masterpiece Maceina is the author of – namely, Buržuazijos žlugimas (Collapse of the Bourgeoisie) - also bears similar poetic tones. In this essay the historiosophic
prophecy dominates over the political and economic analysis of capitalism: “the Bourgeoisie inevitably comes to an end both as a historic guise and as a style of public life”16. Thanks to the so-called analysis of “three souls” Maceina hopes to get to the bottom of all the theoretical problems – he hopes to explain the science, religion, arts and politics.

Maceina adheres to pushing everything to the radical, mystical verge. His philosophical deliberations time and again reflect his walking on a tightrope near to prophecies: “Knowledge of the future presented in the most general characteristics is necessary for the philosophy of history and culture; in this area each and every philosopher becomes a prophet”17. Maceina writes as if he were the poet inspired, the poet who fears no reference to the Apocalypse: “The Revelations in their essence manifest the depth of life; the depth of life contains more than just external-occurrences; it contains occurrences inside the human soul. External-occurrences derive from the inside occurrences, alone. Prior to the revolution taking place inside the state, it had already come to pass through the soul”.18

Maceina used to pose one of his favorite questions: “Is there a lot of time left until the clock of the world strikes twelve?”19 As long as the author writes about the political matters, he is overwhelmed with mystical, not theoretical disposition. A person for him is first of all a religious, and not the political, concept. What he strives for is not some kind of political reforms, he strives for the mystical transformation of the entire mankind: “The vision of the world that is presented by the Revelations is not the one that leads to the collapse, to the happiness of this reality; it is the vision that leads to the universal transfiguration through the universal and sudden catastrophe (Italics – A.M.). This is the main idea of the Apocalypse, which becomes an irreplaceable guideline for the whole philosophy of culture”20.

Maceina is not concerned with the history designed by historians; he is not much interested in the details of the everyday political life. For him the essence of the political events resides beyond the historical time limits: “These are not the laws, not the natural or acquired citizenship, still not the language or the customs that bind together a Christian and the society. It is the unity of the mankind redeemed, which in the bottom of life of the Church is set to found the perfect community”21. The language of his political considerations is permeated with religious symbols and allegories.

Early works of Maceina promised a completely opposite development of his philosophical career. In his Pirminės kultūros pagrindai (Basics of the Primary Culture) Maceina presented himself as an author showing great respect for the specialized sciences (ethnology, in particular). True to say, this was a completely new development the philosophy of culture faced in Lithuania. It was, alas, a short one. In a couple of years Maceina evolved into a radical critic of any
philosophers’ claims over the specialized sciences: “Nowhere else does the positivism flourish except for in the mindless, motionless, bourgeois souls.”

In terms of reputation, his love for ethnology turned into controversial statements. Suffice to mention the fact that he employed the totemic culture to explain democracy: “History of the mankind undergoes the period of time when the totemic male element comes into the light and takes over the rule of the human mind, his activities and his creative works. As a result the theoretical sphere sees the appearance of a mechanist worldview, whereas in the practical sphere it is the sense of democracy that takes ground.”

His understanding of totalitarianism was similar: “...all the totalistic attempts in human history – from Plato to modern theoreticians of state – are but a never-ending manifestations of a matriarchatic principle.”

Šalkauskis held somewhat more positive attitude toward the empirical sciences. In his review of Kazys Pakstas’ book, he admitted the following: “the first romantic period of Lithuanian national renaissance, when the nation of Lithuanians and the land known as Lithuania were treated for the most on the basis of what he or she felt or saw, has ended, it cannot be retrieved. Nowadays we have become aware of the attempts to lay more objective scientific knowledge basis for the folk studies and for the country’s studies; it implies changing of the romantic beliefs of the national and country matters into a more realistic standpoint...”

In one of his Matters of the Moment and the Demands of the Principle Šalkauskis has even embarked on the examination of the issues of public administration.

Such a development is very unlikely in the case of Maceina. This author’s philosophical considerations have always remained detached from the matters of the daily political life. The ideas he propagated could not exert any more expressive effect on real politics. Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes and Thomas Aquinas were also metaphysicians. However, they never tried to conceal the peculiarities of political phenomena. On the contrary, they exposed them. Whereas Maceina tries to evade a more specific analyses of political events. One may get an impression that Maceina treats metaphysics as a means in his fight against politics.

The political philosophy of both Šalkauskis and Maceina had been influenced by the essentalist metaphysical beliefs each of them possessed. These authors believed in the primary elements of the being and had no doubts as to whether the eternal philosophy, based on the Christ. The main difference rests in the fact that Šalkauskis is able to reason beyond the Apocalypse: in addition to that, he is able to consider the division of the powers of the Government, the democracy and human freedom. Maceina, on the hand, evades any more concrete analysis of the political events. He is lured by other, more poetic themes – “juvenile relationship between a man and the nature”, “capitalism as a collapse
of life”, “division of spirits in the present” and “the beginning of the night period in the history”. He treats politics from the standpoint of an artist, and such a view corresponds to all the main canons characteristic to the romantic philosophical cogitation.

Šalkauskis has offered a very wide description of culture: “The material subject matter of the philosophy of culture is culture at large or cultural activity of a human-being. Whereas formal subject matter is to investigate fundamentals considering primary and universal reasons”26. Such a wide concept of culture enabled one to expect that politics would be included into the scope of its phenomena. However, in his works on the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis does not identify politics as a separate cultural phenomenon. What he talks about is knowledge, morality and art27. Later on, Maceina introduced language, education and technique into that list; though, he uttered not a single word about politics. There is something like a tacit agreement existing – the politics must remain outside the confines of the philosophy of culture.

Indeed, it is very interesting to observe how both philosophers search for a place in the family of other sciences the philosophy of culture could be landed into. The most difficult task for them is to identify the relationship between the philosophy of culture and its two most important neighbours – the philosophies of history and society. Šalkauskis is convinced that the disciplines of history and society must be subjected to the philosophy of culture. Maceina, meanwhile, disagrees with such a point of view. In his opinion, the philosophy of culture is the composite part of the philosophy of history.

Among the disciplines familiar to the philosophy of culture Šalkauskis points out to the philosophy of law, the discipline which could be treated as one of the closest neighbors of the political philosophy. What may seem surprising, however, is that this person, – he had graduated from the faculty of Law, - seemed to evade from any more thorough analysis of the philosophy of law. Maceina is consistent in this respect – he completes the extrusion of the political sciences from the confines of the philosophy of culture. He no longer mentions the philosophy of law as a discipline close to the philosophy of culture. More to say, he resists including the philosophy of society into the realm of this discipline.28

To find the middle way between the ideologies that oppose each other is the main objective of Šalkauskis and Maceina. They try reconciling the variety of elements – liberalism and socialism, individualism and collectivism, East and West civilizations, nomadic and matriarchatic origins of culture. Šalkauskis titled this policy “the tactics of Christian balance”29. The concept of an organic and corporate state, based on a balance between three different elements, he devised is the most manifest example of the use of this tactics: "political sphere: individual – political party – state’s central authority; economic social sphere.
individual – professional organization – state’s economic chamber; cultural spiritual sphere: individual – culturally autonomous community – supreme cultural council; territorial sphere: individual – provincial municipality – state’s central authority.”

The aforementioned could be treated as the shortest resume of Šalkauskis’ entire political philosophy.

Maceina endorsed his teacher’s “Christian balance” idea, although, he often admitted he did not know practical means how to carry it out. In one of his articles Maceina wrote: “Of course, given that Catholics are well disposed, even this would not cause much difficulty. However, its legal and national assertion is a very complicated matter.”

Such a belief is evident in his Social Justice, the only masterpiece he offers the doctrine appropriate for the Catholic community in. The aforementioned is a very typical characteristic of this author’s philosophic thinking: he deals with politics on the basis of non-political concepts.

Šalkauskis and Maceina’s political stance is determined by the pedagogical orientation of their philosophy of culture. These authors maintain that the philosophy of culture must serve the educational needs of the Lithuanian nation. They treat politics as a composite part of the Lithuanian nation’s educational purpose. Even in his geopolitical works Šalkauskis is overwhelmed with the cultural mission of the Lithuanian nation, not so much the politics: “Under such circumstances cultural understanding becomes the main objective; it must first of all deal with the concept of the national culture, later followed by the cultural mission of the Lithuanian nation.”

Such a geopolitical treatment destroys the established concept of international politics, based on the analysis of legal, military, economic and political factors.

Šalkauskis and Maceina make no secret of their understanding that Lithuania must “boost the cultural progress of the society”. Identifying of the guidelines for the future cultural development of the country can be seen as the purpose they have designated as the political philosophers. One may get an impression that even living in the independent Lithuania does not help, - these authors are obsessed over the possible loss of political independence. Šalkauskis’ thoughts at the end of the Interwar period prove this very well: “revision of the state territories and even independence itself from outside is eventually likely. It follows that the cultural immunity of the nation and its cultural significance may act as the determining factors.”

The main objective of Šalkauskis as a political philosopher is the preparation of the nation for the life following the loss of the political independence. He is most concerned with the matters of establishing the House of Culture, the Cultural Foundation and the Cultural Institute. In his assessment of a-two-decade independence period he claims: “We have to regret very much the fact that up until now we have lacked clear and well shaped cultural policy, and that up until now we have not established
the House of Culture. There are numbers of different kinds of Houses established; however, what we fail to see in this system of houses is the most important houses, which ought to take care of our recreation from the ill-fated historical heritage and which would arm us culturally.  

Šalkauskis and Maceina can be referred to as the disciples of the conservative tradition of political thinking. What makes them part of this tradition of political thinking is their attitude toward religion, patriotism and the national elements. However, presenting them as conservatives brings about one difficulty – their own critical statements on conservatism. Šalkauskis was used to emphasizing the need to look for a middle way between conservatism and radicalism: “Christian worldview urges the Catholics to be part of the progress; neither conservatism, nor slight progressiveness is good enough for us. In our social psychology we are obliged to combine the spirit of positive traditions with a lively initiative of our enduring self-improvement.” Maceina, one of the most radical critics of the conservative wing of the Catholic community during the Interwar, held similar beliefs.

However, despite all of these circumstances, it is not difficult to prove that Šalkauskis and Maceina adhered to an orientation that characterizes the tradition of the conservative political thinking. Šalkauskis’ philosophy of culture corresponds to the main intention of Edmund Burke – “to preserve and to reform”. Save we view it more closely, we may note that his declarations aim at conservatism’s most radical forms, not the conservatism itself. Šalkauskis is sincere in his wish that Lithuania’s cultural life becomes modern; however, at the same time he wants to preserve Christian forms of cultural life. What may seem problematic is Maceina’s conservatism alone. This author had a weakness for radical statements. He may be characterized as a conservative only with some reservations, if we draw attention to his attitude toward the family, religion and patriotism.

In Lithuanian philosophic literature there are very few discussions on the difference between Šalkauskis and Maceina’s political outlooks. The former can be described as a disciple of political liberalism, whereas Maceina represents the group of thinkers who are in favor of totalitarianism. At the end of the Interwar period he openly talked about the totalitarian nature of the national state.

Classification of Šalkauskis as a member of the liberal camp is quite surprising. It is driven by the fact that Šalkauskis himself was a famous critic of liberalism. We should not, however, yield to the suggestion of his statements. What he called liberalism was in fact this doctrine’s ethical, not political, version. The modern concept of liberalism we find in the works of John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Michael Oakeshott and John Gray may explain the interpretation of him as a political liberal. All these authors do not identify liberalism with the
Likewise, Maceina must be described using the concepts he would not have applied in relation to himself. Leonidas Donskis provided for a very strict assessment of his outlook: “Maceina openly sympathized to all the fascistic elements and even the fascistic regimes he knew of, all the fascistic ideologies he was aware of, and the most reactive, the darkest and the most irrational ideas of his epoch he could have come across.” No doubt, this is an exaggerated critique of this author. First of all, because Maceina had from time to time been directing the spears of criticism toward fascism himself. Besides, even his *Nation and the State* is not a-fascist-propaganda-minded piece of work. Other two designations, namely, that of the “totalitarianist” and “nationalist”, describe him better.

The best description of Šalkauskis is that of “a liberal conservative”. This term split into two parts, we obtain a double characteristic of this author’s outlook – “the political liberal” and “the cultural conservative”. As a follower of cultural conservatism, he adheres to an idea of the natural Christian order: “we live in the limits of the natural order”. His political outlook, at the same time, corresponds to all the requirements of a widely understood liberalism: “the democratic society serves the interests of freedom; from the other hand, the freedom is limited to an extent that is required in order to maintain order and avoid chaos”. Šalkauskis endorses the rule of law as well as the natural human rights, moral pluralism and the significance of the representative democracy. Such a dual interpretation of this author’s works – “cultural conservative” and “political liberal” – is reinforced by the critical outgivings of Vytautas Kavolis. Kavolis is obsessed mainly with the critics of Šalkauskis’ “conservative moral imagination”; however, he always shows honor to his “conscientious engagement with democracy”.

Šalkauskis was against any idealistic treatment of politics: “When we count on uncultivated predilections of the real life alone, we arrive at unilateral social naturalism. When, on the other hand, we count on a pure enchantment of the ideals, we come across the baseless idealism. Meanwhile, neither the former, nor the latter imply the true Christian orientation in our social life and activities.” Maceina in the meantime, pursued an opposite point of view. Vivid idealism marks his political considerations. In cases when the ideal collided with reality, he always picked the former element out of two.

Until now, there was little evidence on Šalkauskis as a consistent supporter of methodological individualism. It is manifest in his critique directed against the organistic treatment of social phenomena: “A scientist, akin to keep a strict analogy between the society and an organism, would be unable to catch the specific nature of social phenomena”. He reiterated this methodological point of view in the discussions on patriotism: “It is the fact that the nation’s real and lively stronghold is the living human personality. This applies to any other
form of the common life either. What reveals itself to us as an organism of common life is the relationship between different people. Moved to the political realm, this methodological principle sounds a bit different: "I have no doubt that the democratic republic is the most complete form of the state system. At the same time, I am just as sure that in reality this complete form is worth of the people who are mastered by it."

Pondering on Šalkauskis' concept of social rights is exactly what may seem as the most difficult task. There is no doubt over his sincere engagement to protect these rights: "Equal rights of all the people is a milk-and-water talk in the so-called democratic society where the individual human rights find no specific guaranty that they will be socially protected." It is very difficult to understand what concrete social rights he protects. His concept of political rights is far more clear. In a situation of collision between the demands of citizenship and nationality he is always take the side of an individual: "moral trespass on national obligations, for instance, given away of ones nationality, is not punishable by means of juridical repressions because personal rights which add up to individual freedoms outweigh the moral right of the nation to demand patriotism of its members. In contrast to Maceina, Šalkauskis had never submitted a demand that the limits of the state and the limits of the nation coincide. Respect for the rights of the national minorities is a composite part of his political philosophy.

In spite of a huge passion for the idea of an organic state, Šalkauskis remained a consistent devotee of the open society. His corporate state theory bore in itself no totalitarian claims. The latter is avoided thanks to a firm and coherent human rights protection policy. Each self-conscious Catholic, in his opinion, must be "a consistent democrat, provided that democracy speaks out the determination to norm out social relations so that the principles of equality, freedom and solidarity, the principles that find the best metaphysic substantiation nowhere but in the Christian worldview are complied with."

These statements are not present in the works of young Maceina. In the beginning of his career this author became known for his expertise in the areas of nationalism and patriotism. For a long time he was a consistent critic of nationalism: "Nationalism is the largest threat to the civilized world." However, such statements were always followed by a very cautious approach towards democracy. Whenever Šalkauskis was criticizing "liberal atomism", Maceina necessarily added to this a remark that he was criticizing "democratic atomism." Such a negative view of democracy was the main reason driving for the evolution of his outlook in the direction of totalitarianism. Starting from 1936 Maceina’s political sympathies had been resting on the side of collectivism and political nationalism.

Individual-Person and the State, his article, can be treated as the first step in that direction. This article is surprising in many respects – inconsistency of
philosophical considerations, mismatch of statements on the level of principle and practice, and statements on the natural origin of the state. Having acknowledged that “the personality is superior to the individual and the state”, Maceina points to the forms of human life which are unable to get along with any respect for human rights. In his opinion, the state has the right to claim that individual’s “body life would serve its goals and its protection”, that the state is entitled to “regulate the size of the family”, “to ban illegal reproduction”, “to arrange and to regulate individual’s property, control its sources”.

The 1939 article *The Nation and the State* in a logical manner completes this author’s evolution in the direction of totalitarianism. No doubt, this is the work propagating extreme political nationalism. This article might make any discussion about organic state frightening. Šalkauskis managed to keep away from the threats of political nationalism and totalitarianism. His disciple infused perspicuous totalitarian touch into the organic state idea. Maceina disregards human rights, including the national minority rights. He is indifferent to the principles of democracy and moral pluralism. It is safe to say that he is the first who coupled together a tendency to accentuate national culture, which was characteristic to the entire interwar philosophy of culture, with the radical forms of political nationalism.

Maceina’s idea of the national state is a logical continuation of his philosophy of culture. So far little attention has been focused on the fact that this idea of this leads to the total disappearance of politics. Maceina is fond of the cultural nature of the nation-state, and talks openly and extensively on the end of politics: “As a matter of fact, the internal politics have been losing their primacy in the nation-state, and its place has been taken by the cultural questions. Thus, the answer of ours – to politicize on the internal issues – is a significant matter”. Having read these lines one may get an impression that the author of theirs is an anarchist. The case is exactly the opposite, however. What Maceina does by means of destroying politics – he expands the rights of the state. He attributes to the political institutions the right to control the education, nurturing, health care, human reproduction, emigration and immigration.

Removing of the state objectives helps Maceina realize his long-bred dream – to move politics out of the cultural sphere. Attention should be paid to the fact that the nation-state he propagates is based solely on the realization of the cultural objectives. Indifference to the political rights of the citizens, in this case, is not only desirable – it is also a necessary element of the social life. This is the moment when the philosophy of culture triumphs over the political philosophy. The state disappears completely in the milieu of the society’s cultural life. It makes any discussions about the political philosophy senseless.

The entire tradition of the philosophy of culture of the Interwar Lithuania stands behind Maceina’s considerations. Main characteristics of the nation-
state he propagates correspond to the pedagogic orientation of this philosophy. Šalkauskis managed to combine the idea of the nation-state with the respect for human rights and democracy. His disciple, in the meantime, durst include the totalitarian state into the list of pedagogic measures. Maceina demands that national minorities be assimilated by violent means; he openly delivers racist slogans. As far as the foreigners are concerned, in his opinion, they can be behaved with in three ways: “either to subdue them to the extent of denationalizing them; or to relocate them into their own country, or leave them alone, as if they were guests taking benefit of being sheltered.”

Maceina oftentimes reminds of a Hegelian without Hegel himself. His philosophy of culture is based on the Hegelian idea of culture as an objectivization of the spirit. However, in comparison to Hegel, in amidst these forms of the objectivization of the spirit, he found no place for the state. His philosophical thoughts try to destroy every substance of political life. He looks for such a form of cultural life of the society, which would have the least possible number of political elements.

Two diverse traditions of moral philosophy stand behind Šalkauskis and Maceina’s political outlooks. Šalkauskis is more close to Aristotle, whereas Maceina – to Plato’s philosophical tradition. Political philosophy of the former is based on the accentuation of the significance of the virtues of behavior. Understanding the importance of the principles of procedural justice very well, Šalkauskis consistently emphasizes the role education of individual’s moral character plays: “the most perfect form of the state system, in principle, is better than aristocratic republic or even the monarchy, save its members are well educated and developed at the same time. In other words, the most perfect and complete form of the state system demands that its citizens be educated and developed as good as possible.” No doubt, this is the motive of the Aristotelian political philosophy. Thus, it is no surprise that in cases when Maceina comes to declare the emergence of a new total state, Šalkauskis persists further on and talks about “the development of a person as a prerequisite of any progress”. The personality development ideas essentially reveal no indications that would remind of a flight from politics. On the contrary, he is used to accentuating that “the development, life, activities, and constant progress of an individual, among other factors, depends on the environment, on the social and cultural status of life.”

Critique of Aristotelism is one of the favorite subjects of Maceina. Both the Social Justice and the Collapse of the Bourgeoisie cannot be understood without this critique. Practical orientation of Aristotelism is what Maceina criticizes it for: “ethica naturalis”, created under the influence of Aristotle, no longer bears that extreme idealism St. Augustine was talking about. Maceina is not interested in practical consequences following the implementation of the political
principles. Political reforms are not what he strives for. He wants a mystical rebirth of the entire humankind. One may get an impression that time and again this author appears incapable of finding the link that binds together the moral principles and the ever changing conditions of political life.

The character of Šalkauskis and Maceina’s philosophical thought reflects some of the requirements laid down by postmodernist author Richard Rorty. The American philosopher makes a demand that those authors who contemplate on the political matters be artist-like. True, it is not difficult to prove that the motives of the worldview, as contrasted to the scientific, analysis dominate in Šalkauskis and Maceina’s philosophical works. If these authors’ works had been dominated by strict scientific calculations, they would have never ever started talking about the world soul, about the “division of souls”, or “the night period of history”. In this respect Maceina, who talks as if were a true artist, is an outstanding example.

Both Šalkauskis and Maceina indifference towards the philosophy of politics is not related to their excessive infatuation with metaphysics. For sure they don’t belong to the people whose interest in metaphysical problems overshadow practical affairs of daily life. Reasons why these authors remained indifferent to political philosophy must be looked for elsewhere - in their enchantment over the network of problems the philosophy of culture faces. These authors thought that the philosophy of culture is capable of finding answers to all the most important issues social and political sciences pose. They treated this discipline as if it were a master’s-key, fit to open every door of humanitarian and social sciences.

Charles Taylor’s idea of splitting the discussion of political philosophy into two levels is very helpful in the understanding of the outlook of Šalkauskis and Maceina. On the first – political philosophy – level we find arguments on the so-called ontological matters: “The ontological questions concern what you recognize as the factors you will invoke to account for social life. Or, put in the formal mode, they concern the terms you accept as ultimate in the order of explanation. The big debate in this area, which has been raging now for more than three centuries, divide “atomists” from “holists”. Argument over the concrete moral and political principles comprises the second level of discussions of political philosophy. On this level we find a discussion concerning the attitude towards the set-up of the political authorities, individual freedom, equality and other political principles. Holding to such a concept, we may prove that the first-level philosophic discussions were dominant in the works of Šalkauskis and Maceina. This rule applies first of all to Maceina’s works. This author shuns any larger polemics over political issues. He evades concrete discussion of the political issues, trying to replace them with the discussions on ontological issues, instead. Šalkauskis feel comfortably on the second level of discussions
on political philosophy. However, since 1926 he had revealed a tendency toward the first level of discussions on political philosophy.

Šalkauskis and Maceina were lucky to avoid what Ronald Dworkin nowadays calls as “external skepticism”. These authors had no intention of getting rid of substantial issues of morality as well as they found no need to look for a value-free phenomena treatment perspective. They understood philosophy as a worldview science: “Cultural beliefs is not the same as extraordinary attitudes; it makes one part of an organic general worldview”. They treated politics through the lenses of a specific moral, religious and philosophical position. Although, the latter does not imply they did not understand the meaning of the principles of impartiality. Maceina alone can be blamed for the non-understanding of this matter. During the Interwar period he earned his reputation as a true opponent of political impartiality and moral pluralism. Šalkauskis remained a consistent champion of state’s neutrality with respect to moral, religious and philosophical tenets throughout this entire period.

Robert Nozick’s notion of political philosophy may be used to defend the perspective of the authors analyzed here. Nozick maintains that any attempts to explain political phenomena by means of the concepts characteristic to this sphere launch the weakest possible version of theoretical explanation. According to him, the version of theoretical explanation, which defines political phenomena on the basis of non-political concepts, is the most superior one. Having applied such a perspective to Šalkauskis and Maceina, we could try proving that they had also put forth similar efforts - they explained politics on the basis of the non-political concepts of the philosophy of culture.

However, such a defense strategy is not suitable in order to assert our authors’ view of political philosophy. First of all, this ensues because the philosophy of culture is unable to play the role the moral philosophy has usually played as a matter of rule. Šalkauskis, for example, says that the philosophy of culture is not a normative discipline. Such a view of his is nothing but an impediment to any possibility that the strategy offered by Nozick will be applied. Political philosophy needs a partner serious who bears in it serious normative claims. Maceina acknowledges the normative nature of the philosophy of culture; yet it does not exceed the level of methodological declaration, however. Even his concept of morality, which is ascetic (not ethic) in nature, will not do for this objective’s implementation purpose.

We must acknowledge that the indifference Šalkauskis and Maceina bestow on the moral philosophy make their way into the political philosophy more difficult. Since the Middle Ages, political philosophy has been perceived as a discipline of “political ethics”. This means that without more attention being drawn on the issues of the philosophy of morality it would be very difficult to carry out a more thorough analysis of the issues of political philosophy. In
meantime, neither Šalkauskis, nor Maceina show any more substantial interest in the issues of the moral philosophy. The former would have preferred analyzing aesthetic, the latter - historiosophic issues. The philosophy of culture these authors provide for is not linked by any more intensive bonds to the analysis of issues the moral philosophy deals with.

Šalkauskis' geopolitical arguments resemble Samuel Huntington's current considerations. In both cases we see the attention being paid on cultural and civilization factors. However, concepts of the "East" and the "West" that are employed by Huntington do not have that strong metaphysical background that is evident in Šalkauskis' works. Our author is more concerned with the philosophical façade of his geopolitical considerations. Huntington would never agree with his idea of a cultural synthesis between the East and the West. He is more familiar with the perspective held by Felix Koneczny, professor of the Vilnius University. In 1938 Koneczny ideas were presented by "Židinys". Both Huntington and Koneczny believe that some kind of synthesis of cultures, which belong to different civilizations, is hardly possible. There has been little evidence that in the aftermath of the Koneczny ideas' presentation in "Židinys" in 1938 Maceina would have had doubts about his teacher's ideas on the cultural synthesis: "Indeed, if the cultural synthesis is impossible, if all the efforts to create such a synthesis lead to the mixture of cultures - it all brings chaos and leads to the cultural collapse - in that case prof. Šalkauskis' concept becomes unreal. In addition to this, it becomes, to some extent, even dangerous because the cultural recession is what grows out of a true synthesis."

It is impossible to explain why the philosophy of culture prospered in the Interwar Lithuania on the basis of a single theory. There is no doubt about one thing: that this philosophy turned out to be the continuation of the national revival days of the XIXth century. Even if the national movements of the other countries did not end up with the boom of the philosophy of culture, Lithuania’s interwar philosophy of culture was a clear illustration of coincidence between the former and the intentions of the national revival movement. Leaders of the national revival and the interwar philosophers of culture, - both of them worked for the same - they wanted to preserve and further cherish Lithuania’s national culture. Nations that are fighting for independence accentuate very much the interests of the community, not individual interests. Isaiah Berlin took note of this aspect: "What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither simply unhampered liberty of action for their members, nor, above everything, equality of social or economic opportunity, still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, organic state devised by the rational lawgiver. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition..."

For Lithuanian philosophers the pursuit for national recognition was often superior to the matters of defending individual rights and freedoms. This was
influenced, among other things, by a long period of lost political independence: "Demise of statehood in our national individuality has developed disrespect and ambivalence in public life in terms of its relationship with the institutions of this life. This is well pronounced even today when the public life has become familiar. Even nowadays a Lithuanian is indifferent toward the state public institutions, he distrusts the latter, tries to get rid of the duties imposed by public life or deceive the managers of this life." It may seem to some extent paradoxical but even the author of this note acted in the opposite way — in the way of suppressing civil initiative instead of instigating it. There is no need to prove that the national state, as propagated by Maceina, was one of the many sources of the erosion of the civil society.

On the other hand, we may disagree with Berlin who maintains that the struggle for national recognition is in a constant conflict with the idea of the civil rights' defending, Šalkauskis' works show that this struggle can be reconciled with the respect for human rights. The major contribution of the above mentioned author into the Lithuanian philosophy of culture is his talent to introduce respect for human rights and freedom. What Berlin says can be applied to Maceina; however, there is no way it can be appropriate to Šalkauskis.

Interwar Lithuania's philosophers of culture often bear a resemblance to the enlighteners devoid of the ideas of Enlightenment. There is no chance modern Western civilization could be thought of as their major enemy, except for the possible original impression. One could deliver numerous quotations that display their conviction that modernization of the country's culture is a necessary one. Šalkauskis and Maceina used to be paradoxical enlighteners: disapproving the ideas of the XVIII century Enlightenment, they sought after the same goals their predecessors from the French camp of enlighteners did — to overcome cultural prejudices, misfit traditions of the economical and political life of the country, over-exaggerated conservatism and isolation in the local forms of life. To modernize the cultural life of the country and, at the same time, preclude negative repercussions of this modernization, - this was a dual objective Šalkauskis and Maceina tried to implement. First of all, this is driven by their desire to withhold and resist religious recession, well-entrenched instrumental intelligence, atomization of social life and decadence of family values.

It is not easy to explain why politics remained on the outskirts of Šalkauskis and Maceina's philosophical interests. There are several arguments we could designate as possible answers to this question. One might try to prove that they were affected by general termination of the political life traditions, which had begun at the end of the XVIII century. In addition to this, we may point to the situation of the interwar Lithuania's political life. Considerations on the features of their character, which had determined their interest in one or another
philosophical discipline, seem as important as the former. In this case one may want to suffice with one conclusion — Šalkauskis and Maceina treated political philosophy as a secondary discipline.

It would seem silly if one chose to reprehend the philosophers on non-endorsing of the analysis of one or another type of issue. And, indeed, this was not the very purpose of this article. The author aimed to draw attention to another realm — the Soviet period left after itself an awry understanding of Šalkauskis and Maceina’s oeuvre. Negative stance of the Soviet authorities against the outlooks of these authors set a biased reputation of them as political philosophers. Šalkauskis and Maceina were interested in political issues, indeed, most often remaining outside the confines of political philosophy as an independent discipline.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

2 Ibid. - P. 269.
5 Ibid. - P. 143 - 153.
6 Maceina A. Individual-asmiuo ir valstybė. - P. 268.
8 Maceina A. Individual-asmiuo ir valstybė. - P. 268.
12 Ibid. - P. 388.
15 Ibid. - P. 465.
16 Ibid. - P. 285.
18 Ibid. - P. 163.
24 Ibid. - P. 390.
27 Ibid. - P. 190.
30 Ibid. - P. 487.
31 Maceina A. Kratkčioninkštis vienomienes klausimai. - P. 481.
33 Ibid. – P. 523.
34 Ibid. – P. 543.
36 Maceina A. Tauta ir valstybė II. – Naujoji Romuva. – 1939, – Nr. 11. – P. 229.
38 Donskis L. Tarp Karlailio ir Klaipėdos. – P. 213. I would approve of Kęstutis Skrupskelis idea on Maceina’s alleged fascism. Nevertheless, I think that this author has picked a misleading strategy of defending Maceina. He seems to depart too much from some of Maceina’s controversial declarations. See: Skrupskelis K. Tarimasis jaunųjų katalikų kartos fašizmas II. – Naujas židinas. – 1999, – Nr. 4. – P. 212–227.
40 Ibid. – P. 471.
42 Šalkauskis S. Raštai. – T. 5, – P. 461.
44 Šalkauskis S. Raštai. – T. 4, – P. 311.
46 Šalkauskis S. Raštai. – T. 5, – P. 479.
50 Maceina A. Menasfasizmo taktos pagrindai II. – Naujoji Romuva. – 1932, – Nr. 6, – P. 159.
51 Maceina A. Individai-asmuo ir valstybė. – P. 229.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
60 Maceina A. Raštai. – T. 1, – P. 159.
62 Šalkauskis S. Raštai. – T. 1, – P. 103.
63 Maceina A. Raštai. – T. 1, – P. 93.
64 Maceina A. Raštai. – T. 2, – P. 360.
66 Hillemans A. Kulturny žaismos problema II. Židinas. – 1938, – Nr. 10.
67 Maceina A. Raštai. – T. 1, – P. 399.
69 Maceina A. Raštai. – T. 1, – P. 493.